Parth Parihar

Welcome! I am a PhD Candidate in the Department of Economics at Princeton University currently in my sixth year. I will be joining the Wallis Institute of Political Economy at the University of Rochester as a postdoctoral fellow for the 2021-22 academic year.

My research interests are in microeconomic theory and political economy. My work focuses on dynamic games and bargaining.

You can find my CV here.

Contact Information

Department of Economics

Julis Romo Rabinowitz Building

Princeton, NJ 08544


Continuous Selections of the Inverse Numerical Range Map, with Brian Lins. Linear and Multilinear Algebra, 2016.

Working Papers

Job Market Paper.

Gridlock, or inefficient delay in bargaining, has become an increasingly salient feature of negotiations-- whether to tackle climate change, enforce agreements amongst a cartel, or enact important legislation. This paper contributes to the study of gridlock by analyzing a dynamic model of repeated two-party bargaining in which status quo agreements and proposal power are in general both endogenous. In introduce a key object of the analysis, the foresight horizon of agents to index the number of downstream, future agreements agents incorporate into their decision-making on current policy. I find that gridlock is generically a feature of equilibrium if and only if foresight is limited. I show that while temporal discounting and the foresight horizon both index a kind of "patience," they affect gridlock in different ways. While limited foresight engenders gridlock, discounting the future more heavily helps politicians arrive at agreement more easily. I also study and explicitly solve the model within the specific setting of legislative bargaining and relate its findings to observed phenomena in public policy-making.
(Note: Previously "Policy Decay and the Determinants of Gridlock")

with Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros.

We study sequential contributions to public goods in a decentralized environment in which commitment to a contribution schedule is not feasible. A natural (partial) solution to dynamic free-riding incentives in this context is for agents to alternate in making small steps towards completion of the project, dividing the larger project into smaller parts. In this paper, we consider a model in which agents with different valuation for the good are selected at random to contribute in each period. We show that if the project is sufficiently large,the unique equilibrium of the model displays endogenous contribution cycles, in which agents of different types alternate making gradual contributions towards the completion of the project. We characterize these cycles in terms of the primitives of the model, and study the efficiency of equilibrium outcomes.

(Note: Previously "Sequential Contributions to Public Goods")

Work in Progress

When Incumbency Limits Productivity

I study dynamic contributions from two agents to a joint, deadline-bound project that has characteristics in two dimensions. Costly advancements are made by a single agent--- the project leader--- at any point of time and allow her to endow the project with her own preferred characteristics. Yet, advancements must also be approved by her collaborator—the respondent—in order to be realized. Such a framework naturally applies to decision making in committees, team dynamics in firms, and legislative bargaining. When agents have heterogeneous costs of contributing to the project, I characterize the ways in which the incumbency of the project leader affects productivity. I show that increasing the likelihood of an efficient project leader decreases contributions from either agent each period prior to the deadline. In contrast, increasing the persistence of any incumbent project leader--- regardless of her type--- increases contributions from the inefficient agent but decreases them from the efficient one. I characterize the welfare-optimal and agent-preferred incumbency rules as either full alternation in leadership or dictatorship. Finally, I show that linking the productivity of a leader to her incumbency can help increase contributions from the efficient agent, but only from below an initial threshold level of productivity, beyond which such an incentive may also discourage contributions.

Sequential Contributions to Multiple Joint Projects

with Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros.

Polarization and the Threat of Third Party Entry

The role that minor parties and dissonant factions play in affecting the behavior of the two large parties in a two-party polity is an understudied phenomenon. In this paper, I study a dynamic model of entry and spatial competition over a two-dimensional issue space in which entry is costly for minor parties. When this cost is sufficiently small so that there is credible threat of competition from a new entrant, the ``incumbent" major parties both separate from the median voter's ideal policy in equilibrium order to thwart the entry of the minor party. Thus, parties act as firms differentiating their products in order to thwart the entry of a competitor that may corner the market of a particular product-characteristic, thus reducing market share for the incumbent firms. The historical relevance of this phenomenon to minor parties in the United States is discussed.

Parth Parihar - Economics Department, Princeton University -