Welcome!  My name is Parth Parihar.  I am currently a Max Weber post-doctoral fellow in the Economics Department at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, Italy.  

I was previously a post-doc at the Wallis Institute of Political Economy at the University of Rochester and recently completed my Ph.D. in Economics from Princeton University.

My research interests are in microeconomic theory and political economy.  My work focuses on the forces that shape cooperation and conflict in dynamic games.

You can find my CV here.

Contact Info

E-mail:   parth.parihar@eui.eu  

Address:   Badia Fiesolana -- Via dei Roccettini 9, 50014 - San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 


with Brian Lins.  Linear and Multilinear Algebra, 2016.

Free-access arXiv Draft

Working Papers

(Job Market Paper; Reject and Resubmit, AEJ: Micro)

Abstract: I explore how incumbency— an office-holder’s re-election probability— affects public good provision, in a dynamic bargaining setting. Two parties disagree over how the public good should be provided, and new investments in the good proposed by the incumbent require the opposition’s approval. When one party values the public good more than the other, increases in incumbency lead to the high-value party providing less of the good but the low-value incumbent more of it. When re-election odds are positively linked with public good provision, such a linkage can paradoxically cause both parties to decrease provision of the good when in office .(Note: Previous draft titled "When Incumbency Limits Productivity")

(Revise and Resubmit, Theoretical Economics; with Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros)

Abstract: We study the ability of multi-group teams to undertake binary projects in a decentralized environment. The equilibrium outcomes of our model display familiar features in collaborative settings, including inefficient gradualism, inaction, and contribution cycles, wherein groups alternate taking responsibility for moving the project forward. Expected delay grows more than proportionally with project size, and some welfare-enhancing projects are not completed, even as agents become arbitrarily patient. A team composed of two equally large groups can complete larger projects than a fully homogenous team, even as the difference in preferences for completion among the two groups is arbitrarily small. Moreover, if the project is sufficiently large, the two-group team always completes the project strictly faster.

(Conditionally Accepted, Quarterly Journal of Political Science)

Abstract: Gridlock, or inefficient delay in bargaining, has become an increasingly salient feature of negotiations-- whether to tackle climate change, enforce agreements amongst a cartel, or enact important legislation.  This paper contributes to the study of gridlock by analyzing a dynamic model of repeated two-party bargaining in which status quo agreements and proposal power are in general both endogenous.  I introduce a key object of the analysis, the foresight horizon of agents to index the number of downstream, future agreements agents incorporate into their decision-making on current policy.  I find that gridlock is generically a feature of equilibrium if and only if foresight is limited.  I show that while temporal discounting and the foresight horizon both index a kind of "patience," they affect gridlock in different ways.  While limited foresight engenders gridlock, discounting the future more heavily helps politicians arrive at agreement more easily.   I also study and explicitly solve the model within the specific setting of legislative bargaining and relate its findings to observed phenomena in public policy-making.

Work in Progress

Polarization and the Threat of Third-Party Entry

Abstract: The role that third parties play in affecting the behavior of the two large parties in a two-party polity is an understudied phenomenon.  In this paper, I study a dynamic model of entry and spatial competition over a two-dimensional issue space in which entry is costly for third parties.  When this cost is sufficiently small so that there is credible threat of competition from a new entrant, the two "incumbent" major parties both separate from the median voter's ideal policy in equilibrium order to thwart the entry of the minor party.  This provides a channel through which minor parties are causes of-- and not merely the products of -- political polarization. The historical relevance of this phenomenon to minor parties in the United States is discussed.

Political Capital and Elections

(with Zeinab Abboutalebi and Federico Trombetta)

Key Idea:  Do voters always want to elect a candidate with more political capital?  We examine the role that electoral pressures play in enticing politicians to reduce their political capital.

Double-Signalling and Informative Obstruction

Key Idea:  Why do voters reward obstruction by opposition parties?  In this project, I argue that obstruction acts as a double signal-- providing the voter with a net negative impression of the incumbent's competence, but more crucially, a net positive impression of that of the opposition.  Similar incentives to 'obstruct' exist in organizations and in platform markets.

Parth Parihar    -  European University Institute   -   parth.parihar@eui.eu